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11 Introduction
Economic theory generally suggests that optimal ﬁscal policy should follow a counter-
cyclical pattern with respect to the business cycles. Namely, if a government respected
these prescriptions, the optimal ﬁscal policy involves a budget surplus in “good times” and
a budget deﬁcit in “bad times”.
Contrary to the theory, a number of recent contributions found evidence that even though
ﬁscal policy in most high-income countries is countercyclical, in many developing countries
it is procyclical1. However, there is no consensus on what might be driving this speciﬁc
diﬀerence among countries in the cyclical property of ﬁscal policy. On the one hand, Lane
and Tornell (1998), Talvi and Vegh (2005) and Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008)
attribute this diﬀerence to diﬀerences in the degree of political pressures and control of
corruption, whereas Ilzetzki (2008) claims that varying degree of political stability among
countries is the cause. On the other hand, Aizenman, Gavin, and Hausmann (1996) and
Gavin and Perotti (1997), and Riascos and Vegh (2003) claim that, the fact that most of
the developing countries loss access to international credit markets in ”bad times” and other
types of borrowing constraints and credit market imperfections provides the key.
In this study we hypothesize that the presence of quite large shadow economies in devel-
oping countries also plays a role in this diﬀerence in policy across countries. First, we review
the theoretical literature and argue that the presence of large shadow economies2 aﬀect the
cyclical properties of ﬁscal policy by increasing the variation of the tax base. Following
this, we set up our hypothesis and ask whether a larger shadow economy would increase
the procyclicality of the ﬁscal policy. Regressions results using both panel and cross-section
data support our hypothesis. Moreover, we also list some policy recommendations, such as
enhancing tax enforcement and improving bureaucratic quality and law and order, that can
reduce the size of the shadow economy and thereby reducing the procyclicality of ﬁscal policy.
1Some of the recent studies are Gavin and Perotti (1997), Lane and Tornell (1998), Lane (2003), Riascos
and Vegh (2003), Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004), Talvi and Vegh (2005), Alesina, Campante and
Tabellini (2007), Battaglini and Coate (2008), Ilzetzki (2008)
2Throughout the paper we use the terms shadow economy and informal sector interchangeably.
2We also extend our empirical analysis to provide support for those policy prescriptions.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section II reviews the theoretical framework
and presents the theoretical link of the inﬂuence of the shadow economy on cyclicality.
Section III outlines the econometric model and states our hypothesis. Section IV describes
the data and reports the empirical results. Finally, section V concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
In the neoclassical models of dynamic economies, balance in government budget con-
straint must be attained in present value rather than in period-by-period basis. Thus, gov-
ernment policies in these economies can involve deﬁcits and surpluses. This enables the
government to distribute tax distortions over time and state of the economy in a welfare-
maximizing way. This problem of smoothing tax distortions is the focus of the theory of
optimal taxation. Since the optimal tax revenue in a given period is not in general equal to
the government expenditure in that period, the theory of optimal taxation is also the theory
of optimal debt policy.
Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Chari et al. (1991), among others in the literature, show
that government debt should have the role of a shock absorber for the economy. The optimal
policy involves budget surpluses in ”good times”, which are associated with above-average
national income and below-average government spending, and budget deﬁcits in ”bad times”,
which are associated with the converse. Thus, unless government spending necessarily has a
strong positive correlation with national income, a policy that does not imply a strong neg-
ative correlation between budget deﬁcit and national income is unlikely to be optimal. One
theoretical way to explore such a seemingly suboptimal policy is by introducing distortions,
such as additional policy constraints and government objectives, into the theory of optimal
taxation.
Talvi and Vegh (2005), for instance, study the optimal ﬁscal policy in a model in which
running budget surplus creates pressures to increase government spending. Although this
distortion is not suﬃcient to produce procyclical budget deﬁcit (i.e., countercyclical budget
3surplus), the results are still interesting for our purpose. The results imply that, when tax
base ﬂuctuates, the distortion makes budget deﬁcit less countercyclical. Furthermore, the
more variable the tax base, the less countercyclical budget deﬁcit is.
This result can provide a theoretical basis for our empirical ﬁnding as well. A well
established fact in the literature studying the shadow economy is that the share of the
shadow economy in total economic activity exhibits a countercyclical pattern. That is,
the relative size of the shadow economy expands during recessions and shrinks in booms.
(See Roca, Moreno and Sanchez (2001)) This movement contributes to the expansion of
the tax base during booms and contraction of it during recessions. Our conjecture is that
by amplifying the ﬂuctuations in the tax base, the presence of the shadow economy can
diminish countercyclicality of budget deﬁcits through the mechanism suggested by Talvi and
Vegh (2005). Therefore, one should expect budget deﬁcit to be less countercyclical in the
countries with larger shadow economies.
3 Hypothesis
To test whether a larger informal sector is associated with a higher degree of procyclicality
of the ﬁscal policy, we set up the following equation using a panel data:
FPi,t = β0 + β1ISi,t +
n X
k=2
βkXki,t + i,t (1)
Here, FPi,t denotes the cyclicality of ﬁscal deﬁcits, to be deﬁned below, ISi,t is the size of
the shadow economy relative to oﬃcial GDP and Xki,t stands for various control variables.
Lastly, i,t is an error term. For all variables i represents the country and t the year of the
data.
In the above expression FPi,t stands for the correlation between de-trended GDP and the
ratio of ﬁscal surplus to GDP. Given this deﬁnition, a positive (negative) correlation between
the ﬁscal surplus-to-GDP ratio and de-trended GDP implies that ﬁscal policy is counter-
cyclical. (procyclical) Therefore, FPi,t gets smaller as ﬁscal policy becomes more procyclical.
43 In other words, one can interpret FP as a measure of the degree of countercyclicality of
ﬁscal policy.
Moreover, we include certain variables among Xki,t to control for other explanations for
the cyclicality of ﬁscal policy. Particularly, we control for the volatility of output, ﬁnan-
cial development, ﬁnancial risk, corruption, political stability, GDP per capita and level of
democracy.4
Moreover, we also pool our data set and also estimate the following cross-country regres-
sion equation:
FPi = β0 + β1ISi +
m X
k=2
βkXki + i (2)
In both cases, what we want to check from our estimation results is that whether β1’s are
signiﬁcantly negative or not. In other words we want to understand whether procyclicality
of ﬁscal policy escalates due to the existence of a large shadow economy or not.
4 Empirical Results
In this section we present the estimation results hypothesized in the previous section.
First, we present panel regressions and then cross-country estimation results:
4.1 Panel Regressions
Since we are testing for cyclicality of ﬁscal policy, we want to observe at least a couple of
cycles in each country. Therefore, we include a country in our sample only if at least 16 years
of ﬁscal deﬁcit and GDP data is available for this country. Moreover, we limit our sample
to countries with at least 1 million inhabitants. These two criteria and availability of data
leave us with 78 countries over the period 1960 to 2007. Fiscal surplus-to-GDP ratio is from
3Following Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008) we could have estimated cyclicality by regressing the
change in the ﬁscal policy indicator to the de-trended GDP. In fact, we have done the analysis with the
estimated coeﬃcient of procyclicality from this paper and our results did not change.
4Our choice of the control variables is not arbitrary. They all are related to previous mechanisms
suggested by the existing literature to account for the diﬀerence in the cyclical properties of the ﬁscal policy
between diﬀerent countries.
5Table 1. Summary Statistics for the Panel
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Cyclicality 0.05 0.32 -0.81 0.88
Shadow Economy Size (in %) 0.34 0.14 0.09 0.68
Political Stability 7.57 0.99 5.1 10.64
GDP per-capita(in thousand GK$) 17.16 16.10 0.268 77.6
Output Volatility 5.99 4.02 2.94 7.15
Investment Proﬁle 9.08 2.09 2.62 11.78
Corruption Control 3.42 1.21 1.32 6
Financial Risk 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.5
Democracy 4.44 1.39 0.98 6
Government Finance Statistics and GDP data is taken from the Total Economy Database
of the Groningen Growth and Development Centre.
Unfortunately, informal sector size estimates are not available for such a long time span.
Informal sector size estimates range from 1999 to 2007 and are obtained from Schneider,
Buehn and Montenegro (2010).
In addition to the informal sector size we also include various explanatory variables in
our regressions. One explanatory variable we use is GDP per-capita which, as mentioned
above for GDP, is obtained from the Total Economy Database of the Groningen Growth and
Development Centre. Moreover, we also use standard deviation of growth of GDP per-capita
to control for volatility of output. Furthermore, we use corruption control, political stability,
and democratic accountability5 indices which are taken from Political Risk Services’s (PRS)
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and they are available from 1984 to 2007.6 Quality
of the ﬁnancial system is proxied by the investment proﬁle index of the ICRG.7 In addition
5In an earlier draft of this paper following Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008), we deﬁned a dummy
variable Democracy in the following way: We subtracted the countrys score in an Autocracy index from
its score in a Democracy index (resulting in a range from -10 to 10) from the Polity IV Project database.
Next, we then deﬁned our dummy variable Democracy which is equal to 1 if the result of the subtraction
is strictly positive and zero otherwise. However, this index does not have any variation from 1999 to 2007
for the countries in our data set. Therefore, we have decided to use the democratic accountability index
provided by the PRS which experiences some variation from 1999 to 2007 and therefore is more suitable for
a panel regression. Cross-country regressions using the former deﬁnition of the democracy variable provide
very similar results.
6For all the institutional control variables including political stability, democracy, investment proﬁle, and
corruption control a higher value means better institutions.
7In an earlier draft of this paper we used legal rights of borrowers and lenders index from the World
Development Indicators to proxy for ﬁnancial development. However, this index is not available as a panel
data. Nevertheless, it is highly positively correlated with pooled investment proﬁle index and therefore our
results are robust to the choice of ﬁnancial development index.
6Table 2: Panel Regressions
Dep. Var.: FP
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
IS -0.67*** -0.49*** -0.52** -0.77** -0.67** -0.68** -0.69** -0.64**
(-3.01) (-2.15) (-2.29) (-2.21) (-2.18) (-2.21) (-2.14) (-2.29)
GDP per-capita 0.006** 0.005** 0.005** 0.002** 0.003* 0.004*
(2.17) (2.33) (2.19) (2.18) (1.91) (1.89)
Democracy 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05
(1.10) (0.94) (1.27) (0.89)






R-squared 0.29 0.28 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.35
Observations 702 702 702 702 702 702 702 702
F-Test 29.08 24.11 27.55 24.01 10.01 9.97 6.09 5.49
All panel regressions include year and country ﬁxed eﬀects. Heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are
reported in parentheses below the coeﬃcients. ***, **, * denote 1, 5 and 10% conﬁdence levels, respectively.
to the investment proﬁle index which is an institutional variable, we also use risk premium8
among the independent variables to control for actual ﬁnancial risk faced by a country that
is not covered by institutional quality.
We should also notice that the estimates of the size of the shadow economy, by their very
nature, are imperfect. Moreover, when we include institutional variables such as corruption,
political stability, democracy and ﬁnancial development in Xki the estimation may become
prone to endogeneity issues. Therefore, we also estimate the model with two-stage least
squares by using various instrumental variables, namely latitude (Hall and Jones (1999)),
an indicator variable for presidential vs. parliamentary regimes (Lederman et. al. (2005)),
indicator variables for the legal system (La Porta et al. (1999)) which might be based on
8This we obtain both from Moody’s and Aswath Damodaran’s website:
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/ adamodar/
7Table 3: Panel Regressions (cont’d)
Dep. Var.: FP
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
IS -0.71** -0.78** -0.80** -0.81** -0.84** -0.79** -0.57** -0.74**
(-2.27) (-2.32) (-2.49) (-2.34) (-2.33) (-2.31) (-2.09) (2.28)
GDP per-capita 0.004* 0.005* 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004
(1.89) (1.91) (1.15) (1.39) (1.05) (0.97) (0.94) (0.87)
Democracy 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04
1.09 (0.83) (0.87) (1.00) (0.91) (0.77) (0.71) (0.49)
Inv. Prof. -0.003 -0.003 0.01 0.005 0.003 -0.003 0.004 -0.002
(-0.27) (-0.21) (0.18) (0.03) (0.14) (-0.11) (0.09) (0.07)
Pol. Stab. 0.11 0.14 0.14* 0.09 0.17 0.08 0.07 0.05
(1.00) (0.92) (1.89) (0.49) (0.31) (0.99) (0.81) (1.09)
Volatility -0.21** -0.17* -0.24** -0.33** -0.35** -0.32**
(-2.22) (-1.93) (-2.45) (-2.44) (-2.31) (-2.31)
Financial Risk -0.13 -0.23 -0.38 -0.16
(-0.23) (0.21) (-0.71) (-0.37)
Corruption 0.21** 0.17**
(2.47) (2.25)
R-squared 0.37 0.35 0.41 0.38 0.41 0.38 0.46 0.42
Observations 702 702 702 702 702 702 702 702
F-Test 4.98 4.59 5.71 5.07 4.41 4.17 5.04 4.89
All panel regressions include year and country ﬁxed eﬀects. Heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are
reported in parentheses below the coeﬃcients. ***, **, * denote 1, 5 and 10% conﬁdence levels, respectively.
one of the British, French, Scandinavian, German or Socialist legal systems.
Since we are limited by the informal sector size estimates which range from 1999 to
2007 our panel regressions have a time span of 9 years and are estimated for 78 countries.
Summary statistics of the cross-country pool obtained after averaging the data for each
country over 9 years are provided in table 1.
Estimation results of our panel regression conducted for 78 countries in a time span
ranging from 1999 to 2007 are provided in tables 2 and 3. In these tables, in addition to
the size of the shadow economy (IS), we add the control variables one by one. In each case
we report results of both the OLS and IV estimation using the above speciﬁed instrumental
variables. The coeﬃcient of interest is the one of the informal sector size. As one can observe
from tables 2 and 3 the estimate of this coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in all
panel regressions no matter which control variable is added to the regression. Moreover,
8Table 4: Pooled Regressions
Dep. Var.: FP
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
IS -0.83*** -0.99*** -0.62** -0.87** -0.57** -0.62** -0.58** -0.64**
(-4.71) (-3.12) (-2.29) (-2.34) (-2.10) (-2.15) (-2.39) (-2.27)
GDP per-capita 0.005** 0.002* 0.004* 0.002** 0.002 0.002
(2.27) (1.93) (1.95) (2.28) (1.05) (1.24)
Democracy 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05
(1.22) (0.82) (1.15) (1.23)






R-squared 0.25 0.21 0.35 0.27 0.35 0.27 0.36 0.28
Observations 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78
F-Test 22.08 21.19 22.55 18.29 8.79 7.19 5.99 5.19
Heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coeﬃcients. ***, **, *
denote 1, 5 and 10% conﬁdence levels, respectively.
the negative sign of the estimates are also not unexpected as we hypothesized that the an
increase in size of the shadow economy should reduce the degree of countercyclicality of
ﬁscal policy. Other variables which yield to consistently signiﬁcant coeﬃcients are volatility
of GDP as in Lane (2003) and corruption control as in Alesina, Campante and Tabellini
(2008). The sign of these coeﬃcients are also not surprising as Lane (2003) documents that
higher volatility of GDP produce more procyclical ﬁscal policy and Alesina, Campante and
Tabellini (2008) show that more corruption (a lower value of the corruption control index)
is associated with more more procyclical ﬁscal policy.
94.2 Cross-Country Regressions
In addition to the panel estimates reported in tables 2 and 3 we also report results of
cross-sections estimates obtained by pooling data on each country from 1999 to 2007. These
are documented in tables 4 and 5. Again, similar to the previous two tables, in addition to
the size of the shadow economy (IS), we add the control variables one by one and in each case
we report results of both the OLS and IV estimation using the above speciﬁed instrumental
variables.
Similar to the panel regression results pooled regressions produce signiﬁcantly negative
estimates for the coeﬃcient of the shadow economy. And again, volatility of GDP and
corruption control index are the only signiﬁcant control variables.
Table 5: Pooled Regressions (cont’d)
Dep. Var.: FP
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
IS -0.61** -0.72** -0.81*** -0.71*** -0.51** -0.85** -0.47** -0.74**
(-2.19) (-2.21) (-2.99) (-3.04) (-2.71) (-2.21) (-2.27) (2.37)
GDP per-capita 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004
(0.87) (0.91) (0.71) (0.89) (1.37) (0.37) (0.34) (1.01)
Democracy 0.03* 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.01
1.89 (0.90) (0.81) (0.92) (0.75) (1.11) (0.39) (0.95)
Inv. Prof. -0.003 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003 -0.003 0.002
(-0.23) (0.39) (0.55) (0.15) (0.21) (0.51) (-0.29) (0.26)
Pol. Stab. -0.09 -0.14 -0.10 -0.09 -0.13 -0.15 -0.09 -0.07
(-0.77) (-0.92) (-1.03) (-0.19) (-0.23) (-1.07) (-0.92) (-0.89)
Volatility -0.17** -0.19** -0.16** -0.22** -0.15** -0.13*
(-2.33) (-2.17) (-2.05) (-2.34) (-2.21) (-1.91)
Financial Risk -0.13 0.31 -0.17 -0.14
(-0.44) (0.09) (-0.99) (-0.21)
Corruption 0.12* 0.12**
(1.97) (2.25)
R-squared 0.37 0.29 0.41 0.33 0.41 0.33 0.44 0.37
Observations 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78
F-Test 5.15 4.90 5.37 4.97 4.21 4.07 5.05 4.95
Heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coeﬃcients. ***, **, *
denote 1, 5 and 10% conﬁdence levels, respectively.
In addition to the cross-country regressions reported in tables 4 and 5 we report some
10more cross-section estimation results. Data for these estimations are obtained, somewhat
diﬀerently than the previous case, as follows: Instead of pooling the data only from 1999 to
2007, we take the time-series average of each variable using all data whenever it is available.
For example, for the FP data, to obtain FPi for a country i, we average FPit not from 1999
to 2007 only, but to utilize a higher time span for cyclicality, we now average it out from
1960 to 2007.
Results of these cross-section regressions are reported in tables 6 and 7. They are not
diﬀerent than the previous pooled regression results and again a higher size of the shadow
economy is associated with a more procyclical ﬁscal policy.
Table 6: Pooled Regressions with Diﬀerent Time Span
Dep. Var.: FP
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
IS -0.89*** -1.23*** -0.52** -0.89* -0.48** -0.52** -0.48** -0.54**
(-5.49) (-4.45) (-2.54) (-1.91) (-2.30) (-2.05) (-2.29) (-2.19)
GDP per-capita 0.004* -0.002 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.001
(1.90) (0.30) (1.48) (0.28) (1.35) (0.54)
Democracy 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04
(1.52) (0.02) (1.50) (1.43)






R-squared 0.23 0.19 0.25 0.24 0.27 0.24 0.27 0.27
Observations 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78
F-Test 22.08 21.19 12.55 11.29 9.09 7.44 6.75 6.19
Heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coeﬃcients. ***, **, * denote
1, 5 and 10% conﬁdence levels, respectively.
11Table 7: Pooled Regressions with Diﬀerent Time Span (cont’d)
Dep. Var.: FP
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
IS -0.54*** -0.82** -0.61*** -0.79** -0.57** -1.15* -0.28** -0.54**
(-2.63) (-2.09) (-3.13) (-2.04) (-2.85) (-1.91) (-2.13) (2.18)
GDP per-capita 0.004 0.002 0.006* 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.0003
(1.53) (0.62) (1.91) (1.29) (1.30) (0.22) (0.29) (0.95)
Democracy 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.17
1.12 (0.90) (0.76) (0.73) (1.05) (0.85) (-0.59) (0.85)
Inv. Prof. -0.0002 0.0002 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.01 -0.004 0.005
(-0.01) (0.009) (0.06) (0.05) (0.20) (0.46) (-0.19) (0.16)
Pol. Stab. -0.03 -0.04 -0.08 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04* -0.06
(-0.76) (-0.90) (-0.43) (-0.75) (-0.63) (1.07) (-1.92) (-1.10)
Volatility -0.1** -0.15** -0.13** -0.18* -0.17** -0.13*
(-2.23) (-2.13) (-2.09) (-1.94) (-2.11) (-1.89)
Financial Risk 0.23 0.46 -0.10 -0.16
(0.74) (1.07) (-0.25) (-0.27)
Corruption 0.12** 0.12*
(2.40) (1.95)
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.35 0.34
Observations 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78
F-Test 5.45 4.90 5.47 4.99 4.30 4.00 5.25 4.85
Heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coeﬃcients. ***, **, *
denote 1, 5 and 10% conﬁdence levels, respectively.
5 Policy Implications
In this section we examine various policy implications of our results presented in the
previous section. As documented in the introduction and in the second section of the paper
where we have reviewed the theoretical framework behind the literature on optimal ﬁscal
policy over the business cycle, optimal (or social welfare maximizing) ﬁscal response to
business cycles should be countercyclical. However, as we have shown in the previous section,
countries with a larger size of the shadow economy follow less countercyclical (or more
procyclical) ﬁscal policy. Therefore, one interesting question one might ask here what the
policy implications of this result are.
Particularly, we ask whether there are any policy recommendations we can prescribe to
policymakers which would reduce the size of the shadow economy thereby also reducing the
12degree of procyclicality of ﬁscal policy. To do this we will estimate the following system
using panel data where we also include factors aﬀecting the size of the shadow economy:
FPi,t = β0 + β1ISi,t +
n X
k=2
βkXki,t + ui,t (3)
ISi,t = α0 +
n X
k=1
αkZki,t + vi,t (4)
In the above speciﬁed system we will speciﬁcally look at values of αk which aim to measure
eﬀects of Zki,t on the size of the shadow economy. Here we include three variables in Zki,t.
One of them is the degree of tax enforcement which when increases we expect to reduce the
size of the shadow economy as mentioned in Ihrig and Moe (2004). The other two variables
that potentially might aﬀect the size of the shadow economy are the level of law and order
and the level of bureaucratic quality according to Johnson, Kaufman and Zoido-Lobaton
(1998). Here, we obtain the law and order index and the bureaucratic quality from PRS’s
ICRG similar to the institutional variables used in previous regressions and the level of tax
enforcement from Ihrig and Moe (2004).
Results of these regressions are reported in table 8. Notice that we use three diﬀerent
methods to do the estimations: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM), and Full Information Maximum Likelihood (ML). All methods yield to
qualitatively similar results. As we can observe from table 8 higher levels of law and order, tax
enforcement and bureaucratic quality are all associated with a smaller size of the shadow
economy which, since β1 is signiﬁcant and estimated to be negative, in turn reduces the
procyclicality of ﬁscal policy.
According to these results, we can conﬁdently say that improving enforcement of tax
policy, quality of state bureaucracy and enhancing law and order within an economy have
all signiﬁcant eﬀects on the cyclical behavior of ﬁscal policy through their eﬀects on the size
of the shadow economy.
13Table 8: Systems Estimations
OLS GMM ML
Dep. Var. FP IS FP IS FP IS
IS -0.57** -0.65** -1.61**
(-2.26) (-2.29) (-2.08)
GDP per-cap 0.003 0.002 0.003
(1.16) (0.05) (0.07)
Democracy 0.03 0.02 0.005
(1.12) (0.65) (0.14)
Inv. Prof. 0.004 0.01 -0.006
(0.18) (0.88) (-0.21)
Pol. Stab. -0.03 -0.02 -0.05
(-0.70) (-0.30) (-1.08)
Volatility -0.32** -0.21** -0.11**
(-2.37) (-2.39) (-2.07)
Financial Risk 0.23 -0.04 0.12
(0.38) (-0.12) (0.13)
Corruption 0.15** 0.21* 0.14**
(2.44) (1.89) (2.10)
Enforcement -0.03** -0.05** -0.04***
(-2.45) (-2.29) (-2.99)
Law and Order -0.03** -0.08** -0.03*
(-2.44) (-2.21) (-1.87)
Bur. Qual. -0.04*** -0.17*** -0.03**
(-3.36) (-3.99) (-2.28)
R-squared 0.43 0.67 0.45 0.47 0.40 0.67
Observations 702 702 702 702 702 702
Heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics (z-statistic in the case of ML) are reported in parentheses below the
coeﬃcients. ***, **, * denote 1, 5 and 10% conﬁdence levels, respectively. In all regressions a constant is
also included but not reported.
6 Concluding Remarks
It is a well documented fact that cyclical properties of ﬁscal policy diﬀers across countries.
Economic theory on ﬁscal policy tells us that optimal ﬁscal policy over the business cycle
should be countercyclical. However, a large number of countries experience exactly the
opposite.
Using both panel and cross-country evidence, our study establishes the association be-
tween the size of the shadow economy and the procyclicality of ﬁscal policy. We found
14that countries with a larger size of the shadow economy tend to have a highly procyclical
ﬁscal policy. Our results are robust even after controlling for various variables used in the
literature to explain diﬀerences in the cyclical properties of ﬁscal policy.
Following our results, policy implications complement those of the existing papers in
literature. More speciﬁcally, according to our study, the public policy should focus more
on taking measures to reduce the size of the shadow economy. Increasing tax enforcement,
enhancing institutional environment through law and order and improving the quality of
state bureaucracy are among the steps needed to be taken by governments.
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